Camus and the philosophy of absurd

Albert Camus develops in his impressive essay Le mythe de Sisyphe his positive view of the situation of Man. He put in perspective the entire existentialist movement, transcends its view and offers an admirable future: Man is condemned like Sisyphe but he is and will be happy in his condemnation.

First, it is an observation, the existentialist observation that Man cannot access the Truth: the world is irrational, relativist, what is true for one may be not for another. But it is also the recognition that Man is nonetheless driven by such Unity of Knowledge. From that confrontation is born the philosophy of absurd:

"[C]e qui est absurde, c'est la confrontation de cet irrationnel et de ce désir éperdu de clarté dont l'appel résonne au plus profond de l'homme."

[Les murs absurdes]

Camus notices, however, that the greatest existentialists failed to pursue their own philosophy and, afraid of their findings, either turned back, consciously or unconsciously, to the religious God they previously eliminated, or looked at this absurdity as a new God. In both cases, they betrayed themselves: they first find that Life has no meaning but finish by giving it a meaning via some artifact.

Camus, instead, thinks that there is no need to such despair:

"[L'homme absurde] reconnaît la lutte, ne méprise pas absolument la raison et admet l'irrationnel."

[Le suicide philosophique]

Or again:

"L'absurde, c'est la raison lucide qui constate ses limites."

[Le suicide philosophique]

Camus considers that Man should look at his fate not only without fear but proudly and live thoroughly and passionately such contradiction and absurdity. He sees the absurdity as an opportunity: instead of keeping oneself blind with illusions, he is fighting, constantly, ceaselessly, the more so knowing that there is no goal to reach. For Camus, the fight, the revolt is the only way of life:

"L'une des seules positions philosophiques cohérentes, c'est ainsi la révolte."

[La liberté absurde]

He seems to join some of the romantic movement who also came to the same conclusion.

What is left is actually a quite positive view of the world, where Man is in charge of his fate:

"Un monde demeure dont l'homme est le seul maître"

[La création sans lendemain],

free of past illusions:

"Non pas la fable divine qui amuse et aveugle, mais le visage, le geste et le drame terrestres où se résument une difficile sagesse et une passion sans lendemain."

[La création sans lendemain]

Camus concludes with the myth of Sisyphus, a man condemned by the Gods in Hell to continually roll up the hill a head-high stone which has to be let it down at the end of each cycle. Although most of us would see it as a punishment, Camus invites to imagine on the contrary the smile of Sisyphus among his time of despair:

"Je laisse Sisyphe au bas de la montagne! On retrouve toujours son fardeau. Mais Sisyphe enseigne la fidélité supérieure qui nie les dieux et soulève les rochers. Lui aussi juge que tout va bien. Cet univers désormais sans maître lui paraît ni stérile ni futile. Chacun des grains de cette pierre, chaque éclat minérale de cette montagne pleine de nuit, à lui seul forme un monde. La lutte elle-même vers les sommets suffit à remplir un coeur d'homme. Il faut imaginer Sisyphe heureux."

[Le mythe de Sisyphe]

"I leave Sisyphus at the foot of the mountain! One always finds one's burden again. But Sisyphus teaches the higher fidelity that negates the gods and raises rocks. He too concludes that all is well. This universe henceforth without a master seems to him neither sterile nor futile. Each atom of that stone, each mineral flake of that night-filled mountain, in itself forms a world. The struggle itself toward the heights is enough to fill a man's heart. One must imagine Sisyphus happy."

[The myth of Sisyphus]

Definition of mass and force and the experimental support of the classic laws of mechanics

Henri Poincaré, one of the greatest mathematicians and rationalist of the 20th century, describes us in his little book, La science et l'hypothèse, how not only it appears at first difficult to define precisely what is mass and what is a force, but it is even impossible and one has to satisfy oneself only to axioms, that is to definitions which are not provable by experience.

Newton's famous law states that the force F is the product of the mass m and the acceleration a:

F = m . a.

According to Poincaré, all the great physicists have defined mass and force differently. For one physicist, mass is the density times the volume but for another one the density itself should be defined as the ratio of the mass to the volume. For another one, mass is the ratio of the force to the acceleration while for another one force is defined as mass times the acceleration. We are turning around and around.

Poincaré explains that for a definition to be useful and scientific, it needs to enable you to perform measurements:

"Quand on dit que la force est la cause d'un mouvement, on fait de la métaphysique, et cette définition, si on devait s'en contenter, serait absolument stérile. Pour qu'une définition puisse servir à quelque chose, il faut qu'elle nous apprenne à mesurer la force; cela suffit d'ailleurs, il n'est nullement nécessaire qu'elle nous apprenne ce que c'est que la force en soi, ni si elle est la cause ou l'effet d'un mouvement."

Poincaré goes on and explains that our experience gives us some ideas on how to measure a force in the case of an isolated system: we introduce the notion of the equality between action and reaction, we deduce that the centre of gravity of the isolated system has a rectilinear and uniform movement, etc. But because there is no perfectly isolated system, all of our deductions cannot be proven exactly by experience. The results of the experience will be close to our prediction but it will not be exact. Without surprise, because we know that, besides the entire Universe, there is no perfectly isolated system.

Thus, did we achieve anything? We have invented some principles using our experience but these principles cannot strictly be proven by experience. Our sole remedy, according to Poincaré is to take these principles as axioms, which would be true and provable by experience if we have a perfectly isolated system:

"Les principles de la dynamique nous apparaissaient d'abord comme des vérités expérimentales; mais nous avons été obligés de nous en servir comme définitions. C'est par définition que la force est égale au produit de la masse par l'accélération; voilà un principe qui est désormais hors de l'atteinte d'aucune expérience ultérieure. C'est de même par définition que l'action est égale à la réaction."

Thus, "[le principe de l'égalité de l'action et de la réaction] ne devrait être plus regardé comme une loi expérimentale, mais comme une définition." Furthermore, masses are only coefficients that have been introduced in the calculation: "les masses sont des coefficients qu'il est commode d'introduire dans les calculs." Indeed, Poincaré states, we could have chosen different values for the mass without contradicting the fundamental principles. The calculation would have been harder to perform, that's all.

One can wonder if all of this is useful? The answer is yes because although we cannot prove exactly the principles and axioms we have stated, the results of our prediction match almost perfectly the results of experience because in reality, many systems are almost isolated. This success should be enough -but is it?- to prevent existentialists, irrationalists and (cultural) relativists to state that science proves that no knowledge is attainable. Almost perfect knowledge is attainable, that is what Poincaré tells us. The fact that our knowledge is imperfect should in the same time reconcile everyone: that imperfection is maybe that little freedom of will, that little irrationality that little je ne sais quoi which is so important to fuel our imagination and creation. But maybe I already went too far...

(all quotations are from Chapter 6 La mécanique classique in La science et l'hypothèse)

Euclidian or non-euclidian geometry?

Euclidian geometry is a geometry familiar to us: only one line can go through two points, the straight line is the shortest path, etc. But there are other geometries which are non-euclidian. One example is the geometry over a sphere. In this case, an infinity of lines can go through two points and the straight line is not the shortest path.

Henri Poincaré asks the question if our experience can prove that the euclidian geometry is true, the non-euclidian ones wrong. The surprising answer is that actually our experience is unable to make the difference and in this sense, no geometry is more true than another. In his own words:

"Il est donc impossible d'imaginer une expérience concrète qui puisse être interprétée dans le système euclidien et qui ne puisse pas l'être dans le système lobatchevskien [on a sphere], de sorte que je puis conclure:
Aucune expérience ne sera jamais en contradiction avec le postulatum d'Euclide; en revanche aucune expérience ne sera jamais en contradiction avec le postulatum de Lobatchevsky."

Interesting to know that there is not an absolute in geometry as well.